"Classifying Mormon Theism" more

Forthcoming in Jacob Baker, ed., Sowing the Fields of the Peacemakers: Essays on Mormon Philosophy and Theology in Honor of David L. Paulsen (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2010?). Classifying Mormon Theism Carl Mosser Eastern University Introduction David Paulsen commenced his academic career in 1975 with a doctoral dissertation that compares the philosophical coherence of Mormon and classical theism.1 David was not the first Latter-day Saint to present serious philosophical arguments for Mormon theism over and against classical theism. Early in Mormonism's history the self-taught Pratt brothers and B.H. Roberts pioneered this area with impressive skill. Neither was David first to bring to the task a professionalism developed in the course of pursuing a Ph.D. in philosophy. In this he followed the path of individuals such as William Chamberlin, Sterling McMurrin, and Truman Madsen.2 Nonetheless, David's dissertation marked an important milestone in the maturation of Mormon thought. David was able to collate the insights of his predecessors and bring Mormon thought into dialogue with contemporary philosophy of religion. Moreover, by utilizing the tools of the analytic method, David presented arguments for Mormon theism that were more sophisticated and rigorous than those of his predecessors. In subsequent scholarship David has shown himself to be an admirably shrewd apologist. Whether addressing the problem of evil, divine embodiment, or Social Trinitarianism, David is always concerned to defend and commend a distinctively Mormon theism. Even when it does not look like that is what he is doing, that is what he is doing! For example, in one of his early articles David discusses the question of whether God must be incorporeal.3 To the uninformed reader this looks like the sort of piece a philosopher writes to explore a question merely because it is interesting. Mormonism is nowhere mentioned. Nonetheless, David's intent is to demonstrate that the LDS commitment to divine embodiment is philosophically tenable. His related articles on divine embodiment in Origen and Augustine might be taken as the work of a "Comparative Coherence of Mormon (Finitistic) and Classical Theism" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1975). 2 Due to poor health, Chamberlin suspended his doctoral studies at Harvard never to resume them. 3 "Must God be Incorporeal?" Faith and Philosophy 6/1 (1989): 76-87. A subsequent essay of the same title appeared in Mormon Identities in Transition, ed. Douglas Davies (London: Cassell, 1996), 204-210. 1 dilettante patrologist.4 Ever the lawyer,5 he is calling these Church Fathers to the witness stand to give reluctant testimony to the existence of a key Mormon teaching among the early Christian communities.6 Similarly, another of David's articles appears to be an analysis of William's James' critique of the God of the philosophers and a description of James' alternative.7 In reality the article is a critique of traditional Christian theism and a defense of the God of Joseph Smith. David has produced several clear explanations of what he considers to be the basic metaphysical tenets of Mormon theism: eternalism, pluralism, theological finitism, and materialism. This has usually been done in the course of comparing and contrasting alternative concepts of God. For example, his earliest expositions identified significant points of similarity with the views of William James, John Stuart Mill and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Subsequent work has identified points of commonality with Process Theism, Open Theism, and various other movements within contemporary theology. On the other side of the coin, David has frequently argued that Mormon theism is biblically and philosophically preferable to classical Christian theism, especially with respect to the problem of evil. This comparative method is illuminating, but it also raises an important question: How should we classify Mormon theism with respect to broader theistic categories? David's work lays important groundwork for an answer but does not develop one. It is popularly assumed that all theological systems can be classified according to a taxonomy in which the highest level categories are atheism, monotheism, and polytheism. The question before us is how to properly classify Mormonism. The apparent simplicity of this question is betrayed by the fact that scholars have variously placed Mormonism in each category. The reasons for these incommensurate conclusions is simple. First, these terms simply do not form a comprehensive taxonomy—at least not in the manner that many people suppose. The supposition that they do is based on mistaken assumptions about the meanings and etymologies of these words. Second, traditional Mormon theism affirms significant metaphysical and theological positions comparable to those found in paradigm examples of atheism, monotheism, and polytheism. However, in each case significant dissimilarities also "Early Christian Belief in a Corporeal Deity: Origen and Augustine as Reluctant Witnesses," Harvard Theological Review 83/2 (1990): 105-16; "Reply to Kim Paffenroth's Comment," Harvard Theological Review 86/2 (1993): 235-39; and (with Carl W. Griffin), "Augustine and the Corporeality of God," Harvard Theological Review 95/1 (2002): 97-118. 5 Prior to pursuing his Ph.D., David earned a J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School. 6 The apologetic argument is made explicitly in "The Doctrine of Divine Embodiment: Restoration, JudeoChristian, and Philosophical Perspectives," BYU Studies 35/4 (1996-96): 7-94 and "Divine Embodiment: The Earliest Christian Understanding of God," pages 239-93 in Early Christians in Disarray: Contemporary LDS Perspectives on the Christian Apostasy, ed. Noel B. Reynolds (Provo: FARMS and BYU Press, 2005). 7 "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and (William) James," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 13/2 (1999): 11446. 4 2 exist that make it both unhelpful and misleading to categorize Mormon theism simply as a species of atheism, monotheism, or polytheism. I will suggest that Mormon theism is sui generis, but if a single category is needed, then Anglo-American finitistism may be the most useful option. In order to reach that conclusion we will need to first make our way through an etymological bramble patch. I. Problems with -theism Terms Everyone believes in no gods, one god, or more than one god.8 This grounds the popular assumption that all theological systems can be grouped into primary taxa determined by the number of gods they postulate. On this view all systems that reject belief in any gods are versions of atheism, those that affirm belief in only one god are species of monotheism, and those that affirm belief in more than one god are types of polytheism. Terms built on the same etymological pattern are employed to refer to supposed subcategories, e.g. henotheism as a genus of polytheism and pantheism as a genus of monotheism. However, such a taxonomy proves inadequate given the variety of actual religious beliefs. The problem is partly relieved by employing supplemental categories such as deism, dualism, monism, polydaemonism and totemism. Even so, some religions cannot be classified according to strictly quantitative criteria without causing distortion and confusion. Mormonism is one of those religions, or at least that is what I will argue. The Etymological Objection It might seem counterintuitive that counting gods cannot establish whether a theological tradition qualifies as atheistic, monotheistic, or polytheistic. Indeed, some people are quick to offer a rejoinder that appeals to the etymology of the terms. The Greek word for 'god' is theos (θεός). The compound word formed when theos is prefixed with the alpha privative refers to belief in "no god." The compound word derived from monos and theos refers to belief in "one god." Similarly, the compound of polus and theos refers to belief in "many gods." As stated above, every theological system affirms belief in no gods, one god, or more than one god. Thus, we should be able to classify any theological system as a species of atheism, monotheism, or polytheism by counting gods because the meanings of these words correspond to the acknowledged fact. On the surface this rejoinder appears cogent but it ultimately fails. The reason is that it depends upon a fallacious appeal to etymology, it is uninformed by the history of actual usage, and it fails to sufficiently consider the concepts to which these words refer. In the sense used here, agnostics and atheists both believe in no gods. The difference is that the atheist asserts the improbability that any god exists while the agnostic merely withholds belief. 8 3 Etymological Fallacies The etymological fallacy comes in at least two distinct forms. The first form assumes that a word's "real" or "true" meaning is the earliest meaning that can be documented for it and that this original meaning is somehow retained in all subsequent usage. An examples of this is the assertion that "the word 'silly' comes from the Old English word 'selig,' and its literal definition is 'to be blessed, happy, healthy and prosperous.'"9 The second form of the fallacy assumes that the real meaning of a word can be determined by analysis of its constituent parts (etymons). We see this when we are told such things as "Whenever you say 'Good-bye' to someone you are literally telling him 'God be with you.'" The etymological objection commits the second form of the fallacy. Both forms fail because they treat word meaning as if it is natural and stable rather than conventionally determined and mutable.10 However, word meaning must be determined by the immediate context of any particular occurrence, current patterns of usage in the language at large, and by usage in older texts that continue to be read by people outside the philological disciplines. This does not deny that etymology can occasionally help determine the meaning of a word, but it is frequently an unreliable guide. In this case appeal to etymology does not reliably inform us about meaning. In addition to an inappropriate appeal to etymology, the objection takes the meaning of the etymons to be self-evident—at least if one knows some Greek. However, even if the meanings of atheism, monotheism, and polytheism could be determined merely by analysis of their etymologies, establishing those meanings would not be as simple as the rejoinder assumes. This is because of two things. First, theos has had a very broad semantic range over the course of its history. Second, atheism, monotheism, and polytheism are early modern terms coined by French and English intellectuals. When we trace the history of these terms, we find that they were coined to emphasize qualitative notions and that this usage has endured alongside etymologically inspired definitions. It will take a few pages to trace these histories, but doing so will supply important background information that informs my argument. What is (a) theos? Every first-year Greek student is taught that theos simply means 'god' or 'deity'. Furthermore, it has been frequently assumed that theos (pl. theoi) is related to the Latin I came across this statement on the internet unattributed. A search of Google Books shows that it comes from Zig Zigler, Over the Top, rev. ed. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1997), 98. 10 There is a non-conventional connection between the meaning of an onomatopoeic word and the thing it signifies, but even here convention plays an important role in determining meaning. This can be seen in the variations between onomatopoeic words in different languages that refer to the same thing (such as animal sounds). 9 4 word deus and its Indoeuropean cousins.11 This is incorrect. Theos was coined from a different root and did not begin its career as a noun that simply refers to deities. It is unclear why a new word was coined or how it came to displace words stemming from the Indoeuropean dieu/deiw root.12 What is clear is that the word's meaning in antiquity was never as restricted as the English words God and god or their modern European equivalents. Indeed, it was used in highly equivocal ways that doom any simplistic appeal to etymology. Walter Burkert has argued that theos is built on the thes- root and thus unrelated to the Latin deus. He observes that in Homer and other early writers theos is closely associated with several words clearly built on the thes- root. These words usually point to extraordinary experiences, "especially to smells, noises, and voices encountered in the range of seers and singers."13 Burkert notes that theos could be used to refer to such things as good luck, impersonal powers and forces, and even the recognition of friends. It could also express reaction to certain situations and sudden surprise. From the classical period onward theos was used as an attributive term expressing such qualities as immortality, glory, incorruptibility, blessedness, and sublimity.14 This usage probably predates its employment as a substantive and persisted throughout antiquity. As a substantive, theos referred to various beings associated with the infra- and supramundane realms, especially divinities credited with the inspiration of oracles or the governance of some aspect of nature or human society. The connection between the gods and their corresponding phenomena was never fully abandoned, but the gods took on more personal and more human traits. It was widely thought that gods and humans were the same basic kind of being, but the gods occupied a higher level in the order of being. Whereas human beings were weak and subject to death, the gods were immortal and possessed extraordinary powers within their particular spheres of The prima facie plausibility of this assumption stems from (1) their synonymy when designating deities and (2) the fact that in Indoeuropean languages d, th, and t are often equivalent in cognate words. For example, the following words all have the same root and meaning: thugatēr (Greek), tochter (German) and daughter (English). 12 The dieu/deiw root appears in numerous words referring to the day, daylight, and the sky. Most notably, it appears in the name of the great sky-god, Father Sky—Diespiter/Juppiter (Latin), Zeus pater (Greek). This seems to reflect an original association between the major divinities and the bright daylit sky. Walter Burkert suggests that a new word was coined because the Greeks moved away from associating their gods with the sky. See his "From Epiphany to Cult Statue: Early Greek Theos," in What is a God? Studies in the nature of Greek Divinity, ed. Alan B. Lloyd (London: Duckworth, 1997), 15-16. 13 "From Epiphany to Cult Statue," 19. 14 Illustrative examples can be found in: Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 271-72; W.H.S. Jones, 'A Note on the Vague Use of ΘΕΟΣ,' The Classical Review 27 (1913): 252-55; Ivan M. Linforth, ὉΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΙΖΟΝΤΕΣ (Herodotus iv. 93-96),' Classical Philology 13 (1918): 23-33 (esp. p. 26); Hermann Kleinknecht, 'θεός,' TDNT, 3:70; Arthur Darby Nock, Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Zeph Stewart, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), pp. 144-45, 260-61. 11 5 authority that could be used to assist or afflict human beings. Thus, the gods were worshipped in order to secure their favor. The noun theos could also refer to the cult statue that was variously thought to represent the deity, be indwelt by it, or be the location from which the deity's power emanated. Theos was employed euhemeristically of heroes who had been granted immortality and elevated to the pantheon in recognition of their great deeds or personal virtues. In the Hellenistic era kings were also honored in this manner, a practice that was later adopted by the Roman Emperors.15 These divinized humans became the objects of cults. As time went by a pronounced skepticism about the traditional gods developed in philosophical circles. Skeptics formulated arguments to show that the kind of embodiment and sentience attributed to the gods was incompatible with imperishability and immortality, hallmark properties of the truly divine.16 Thus, philosophers appropriated theos to refer to the ultimate principle of organization or movement in the cosmos, i.e. that which constituted the cosmos as a universe rather than a multi-verse or pluri-verse, despite its evident multiplicity. Many schools of thought went further and described this principle as transcendent, personal (or quasipersonal), and the proper object of worship who providentially governs the universe. Whatever else might be said of this theos, he was unlike the anthropomorphic, immoral, and capricious theoi of Homer and Hesiod.17 He was a different sort of theos altogether. A few philosophers advocated abandoning the traditional cults, but most either considered the gods to be manifestations of the one theos or took the view that a person could worship the one theos through the guise of worshipping the traditional theoi. This view became influential enough among some writers that the grammatical distinction between the singular theos and the plural theoi became practically meaningless.18 They could refer to the theos or the theoi collectively with no apparent difference in meaning. A great deal of literature has been published on this topic. A state-of-the-art discussion can be found in Hans Josef-Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 250-330 or Ron C. Fay, "Greco-Roman Concepts of Deity," in Paul's World, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 51-79. 16 See A.A. Long, "Scepticism about Gods in Hellenistic Philosophy," in Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, ed. Mark Griffith and Donald J. Mastronarde (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 279-91. Available online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucbclassics/ctm/festschrift19. 17 For an accessible overview, see Malcom Schofield, "Theology and Divination" in Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E. Lloyd (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 498-510. More detailed treatment can be found in Werner Jaeger's classic, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947) and Lloyd P. Gerson, God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology (London: Routledge, 1990). 18 R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, "Polytheism," in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade, 16 vols (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 11.439. 15 6 After Hellenism spread under Alexander and his successors, Greek-speaking Jews employed theos to refer to their national deity, pagan deities, cult statues, and, in rare contexts, human beings.19 Something could be identified as a theos because it was a heavenly being, exemplified divine attributes like immortality, or served as the object of cultic devotion. Worship was the most basic criterion for whether something was a theos in the sense of deity. It was irrelevant whether the object of worship was considered by Jews to be the one God, a secondary heavenly being, a demon, a cult statue, or a figment of the imagination. These were all theoi, but equivocation allowed Jews to also assert that theirs was the only true theos without contradiction.20 While Gentiles could insist that people should worship only their own nation's deities, Jews universalized their insistence that Israel's God is the only proper object of worship. All nations should exclusively worship this God because he is the all-powerful and sovereign creator of all reality.21 As such he was in a class of his own, metaphysically unlike anything else that might be referred to as a theos.22 Thus, Israel's national deity was considered the only true theos to whom all nations would ultimately give their devotion.23 In the Patristic era, Christians largely followed Jewish usage. But in soteriological contexts they sometimes used theos in reference to the final state of redeemed human beings. First-century Christians had proclaimed a notion of salvation in which the redeemed would be resurrected immortal, incorruptible, glorious, and blessed by virtue of their union with Christ in his death and resurrection.24 Because Illustrative examples can be found in Marianne Meye Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 17-55. The chapter is titled "The Meaning of 'God'." For discussion of Jewish texts that use theos in reference to human beings, see Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 53-78. 20 For illustrations, see Michael Frede, "Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in Later Antiquity," in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 58-67. 21 Jews like Philo of Alexandria expressed this in the language of Greek metaphysics. Most Jewish texts, however, identify the God of Israel by a variety of other means that forcefully make many of the same points. See Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 6-13 (reiterated and expanded upon in various ways on pp. 114-16, 152-64, 233-34). 22 There is currently a healthy discussion about the nature of early Jewish monotheism, especially as it relates to the Christology of the New Testament. A few scholars go so far as to argue that Second Temple Judaism was not monotheistic or that it was monotheistic only in a qualified sense. These claims will be briefly described below. 23 The eschatology of the Old Testament already anticipates a time when Gentiles would worship God in his temple and when Gentile nations would become God's own people. See Ps. 96:7-10; Isa. 2:2-4; 19:2125; 25:6-8; 56:6-7; 66:23; Jer. 3:17; Amos 9:11-12; Mic. 4:1-5; Zech. 2:11; 14:16. Several of these texts tie the sovereignty of Israel's God over gentiles to the fact that he is creator of "the heavens and the earth." 24 Matt. 5:2-11, 13:43; John 17:22; Rom. 2:7, 5:2, 6:5, 8:18-30; 1 Cor. 15:42-55; 2 Cor. 3:18; Phil. 3:21; 2 Thess. 2:14; 2 Tim. 1:10; Heb. 2:10; 1 Peter 1:3-4, 23. Cf. Dan. 12:3. 19 7 each of these attributes could be synonymous with the attributive use of theos, it was natural for native Greek-speaking Christians to summarize redemption in terms of being made theos (attributive) or a theos (substantive).25 Later Hellenistic philosophers also spoke about the elevation of human beings to immortality, incorruptibility, etc. and thus to the level of theos through the exercise of virtue or by various theurgic means. 26 These Christian and philosophical usages differ from the euhemeristic elevation of heroes and kings in that the human who becomes theos is not an object of worship or veneration, i.e. he or she is not a deity. Throughout antiquity theos had a broad semantic range. Even when restricted to its most common usage ('god', 'deity'), it was used in highly equivocal ways. The gods of the Greek pantheon, the various first principles of the philosophers, and the God of Jews and Christians were all understood to be objects of worship, but they did not necessarily refer to the same sort of thing. Yet, there was little chance of confusion. In this respect theos was similar to our word love. In one breath a man can profess love for God, his wife and his neighbor, but he will be in deep trouble if he loves them all in the same sense. He may also love his job, his car, Beethoven's symphonies, and pepperoni pizza. In each case he "loves" in highly equivocal senses but few fluent speakers of English speakers would confuse the different meanings employed. Finally, the semantic range of theos narrowed due to the influence of Christian theology during the Byzantine and Modern eras. Earlier synonymies fell out of use so that the word is now used in Modern Greek almost exclusively to refer to deities and as an element in certain idiomatic constructions—much like the contemporary English words God and god. It should now be clear that defining atheism, monotheism, and polytheism etymologically is not as straightforward as people tend to think. This is due to the fact that their common etymon has functioned for much of its history as a polyseme, a word with multiple related meanings. This being the case, we must ask whether the etymon functions within these three words univocally or equivocally. In the next section I will argue that it has always functioned equivocally. That explains why these terms cannot function as a set of coordinate first-level taxa by which all religious or theological systems can be classified, at least not in the strictly quantitative manner than many people assume. The significance of this terminology is discussed in Carl Mosser "The Earliest Patristic Interpretations of Psalm 82, Jewish Antecedents, and the Origin of Christian Deification," JTS 56/1 (2005): 30-74. The way some Mormons have misunderstood its significance is addressed on pp. 41-46. 26 E.R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 74101. 25 8 The Invention of -theism terms & the Taxonomy of Religions To begin, it should be observed that the words atheism and monotheism do not have any equivalents in ancient Greek. Though built on Greek roots, they are not Greek words. Polytheism has an ancient Greek equivalent (polytheos, polytheia), but it is really a modern reinvention that can convey nuances that polytheia did not. All three are modern words coined during the sixteenth and seventeenth century as terms of art. This is an example of the modern tendency to coin words built on Greek and Latin roots in order to create special terms with precise meanings or referents. A great deal of medical, scientific, theological, and philosophical jargon consists of such words. In ancient Greek texts the adjective atheos and the noun atheotēs mean such things as without the gods, denying or neglecting worship to the gods, abandoned by the gods, impious and godlessness.27 They can also be used in reference to those who deny the gods of a city or nation. This can take the form of denying the existence of all gods or denials that we would not consider atheistic. For example, one could be considered atheos for preferring another nation's gods over those of one's own people. Jews and Christians were often labeled atheists because they refused to participate in the cults of the Greek and Roman pantheons and because there was no cult statue in the Jerusalem Temple (pre-70) or in synagogues and churches. By common Greco-Roman standards, they did not worship any theos and were thus atheos. While there were people who denied the existence of any sort of deity, there were no Greek terms quite equivalent to atheism or atheist. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, atheism was derived from the French athéisme in about 1587. The French terms athéisme and athée (atheist) had themselves just been coined in the previous decade. The modern term began with a meaning roughly equivalent to the Greek atheotēs. However, this meaning was soon supplanted and atheism became a designation for belief systems that deny the existence of God—in particular, the God of the monotheistic religions. The Oxford English Dictionary attributes the first use of monotheism to the influential Cambridge Platonist Henry More in 1660.28 More coined the word to distinguish between ancient pagan views that equate the one God to the material world Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Greek-English Lexicon with a Revised Supplement, rev. and augmented by Henry Stuart Jones (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), sv. ἄθεος and ἀθεότης (pp. 31 *main text+, 9 [supplement]). 28 An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness… (London, 1660), 61-62. A search of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae and standard lexicons finds no occurrences of the expected Greek equivalent, monotheotēs. The related term monotheia is found in two texts. The first is an odd work mis-attributed to Julias Africanus, Events in Persia after the Birth of Christ (ANF 6.127-30; PG 10.97-108). There monotheia is used once in the sense of 'singular divinity' (PG 10.101). The word is next found in the fourteenth-century Historia Romana by Byzantine historian Nicephorus Gregoras. It occurs in a single passage comparing one party's position in the Barlaamite Controversy with unitary views of God found among Jews and Persians (969.4). 27 9 from the proper understanding of God's oneness. This was part of a larger project in which he develops a typology of religions in which monotheism and atheism are antonyms.29 Ultimately all religions and theologies qualify as versions of one or the other. Judaism and the philosophical monotheism of the Greek philosophers are corrupt versions of monotheism. Pantheism, on the other hand, pretends to be a version of monotheism but is actually a form of atheism. Polytheistic religions are likewise classified under atheism. It might seem odd that a religion that affirms belief in many gods and another that affirms belief in only one God can equally qualify as atheistic. While belief in one God is necessary for monotheism, it is not sufficient if the purported God does not share the basic qualities More finds in his paradigmatic examples. Clearly, the number of deities postulated or worshiped is not the central question. Rather, More is concerned with the kind of deity that is affirmed. Quantity plays a role only in that the type of theos found in monotheistic religions is such that there can only be one. He is necessarily unique. Thus, metaphysically he is not in the same category as the theoi of polytheistic religions. Polytheistic religions affirms the existence of deities, but they are forms of atheism because they do not affirm the existence of a theos of the sort that monotheistic religions affirm. Similarly, metaphysical differences between the theos of monotheism and that of pantheism are so great that the latter cannot be taken as monotheistic despite the affirmation that only one theos exists. Three characteristics of More's typology should be noted. First, the typology has only two first-level taxa: monotheism and atheism. All other -theism terms are subordinate categories. Atheism does not necessarily deny the existence of all deities. Rather, it is the specific denial that any God exists like the one affirmed by classical Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in the early modern period. It is the negation of what we today refer to as classical theism. Second, the theos etymon equivocates between various -theism terms by referring to different kinds of beings. Third, the three main theism terms with quantitative prefixes (a, mono, poly) are not really quantitative designations. They are qualitative designations that assume particular criteria derived from paradigm examples.30 In what follows I depend on the descriptions of More's taxonomy in Nathan MacDonald, "The Origin of 'Monotheism'," in Loren T. Stuckenbruck and Wendy E.S. North, eds., Early Jewish and Christian Monotheism (JSNTSup 263; London and New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 204-15 and by R.W.L. Mowberly, "How Appropriate is 'Monotheism' as a Category for Biblical Interpretation?" in Stuckenbruck and North, eds., Early Jewish and Christian Monotheism, 216-234. 30 MacDonald does not appreciate the significance of this when he apparently agrees with Gregor Ahn that the language of polytheism and monotheism "prioritizes one particular question, that of the number of deities" ("Origin of 'Monotheism'," 212). In More's case, at least, that is certainly not the case. 29 10 The characteristics of More's typology have been retained in subsequent usage alongside the tendency to give simple etymological definitions.31 A nice example is found in The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion. The editors tell us that the composition of the word monotheism "indicates that monotheism is a form of theism, that is, belief in a personal divine being, but biblical monotheism differs from polytheistic paganism not only quantitatively in the number of gods professed but also qualitatively in its understanding of God as absolutely above nature and in complete mastery of it."32 The definition of theism included here excludes some forms of pantheism because they deny that the divine being is personal. Though postulating the existence of exactly one deity, they are not monotheistic since monotheism is taken to be a variety of theism (in the narrow sense). Emphasis on primarily qualitative rather than quantitative criteria accounts for the distinction between God and god in the traditional English lexicon. God is used to refer to the deity of classical Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faith while god is used in reference to deities associated with the pantheons of ancient Greece, Egypt, Scandinavia, etc.. This distinction reflects the fact that metaphysically different types of deities are in view. It also implies a theological judgment: God refers to the one true deity of classical theism while god refers to any of the false deities of mythology. While this might look like a mere capitalization convention for a polysemous word, it is arguably the case that linguistically god and God are different words. They are partially synonymous homonyms. Both refer to supramundane beings that are objects of cultic devotion. Every God is a god in that sense, but most gods are not a God. Unlike god, there is no true plural for God. A God is understood to be the absolute creator of all other reality and metaphysically such that only one can exist. A god, on the other hand, is understood to have such a nature that more than one can exist and no god can be described as the absolute creator. Furthermore, God can function as a proper name whereas god cannot. It refers to a particular divine person with particular attributes. When discussing certain non-classical theisms, God is employed analogically (e.g., Process Theism) or as a rigid designator for the God of the Bible (e.g., Mormonism). In recent usage, however, some academic and religious writers intentionally conflate the two words for methodological or ideological reasons. Thus, some people treat God and god as homonyms with overlapping semantic ranges while others treat them as a single polysemous or even univocal word. I deliberately pass over appropriations of monotheism and related terminology that arose between the sixteenth century and today (e.g., in the literature of the Deists and Unitarians). For my argument it is sufficient to illustrate that the terms continue to be used in something like More's sense. 32 R.J. Zwi Werblowsky and Geoffrey Wigoder, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 477. Emphasis added. 31 11 Summary In this section I have attempted to demonstrate that it is not unproblematic to define atheism, monotheism, and polytheism etymologically. While the meaning of the quantitative prefix in each word is straightforward, theos has had a broad semantic range throughout its history and could be used in highly equivocal ways. Moreover, though based on Greek roots, these terms were coined or reinvented in the early modern period in an attempt to classify religions and theological belief systems. Atheism, monotheism, and polytheism were coined as qualitative designations and only the first two functioned as first-level taxonomic categories. This usage has persisted alongside the more recent tendency to treat these words as quantitative designations. I will now illustrate how quantitative definitions cause confusion within scholarship. Furthermore, I will argue that etymological definitions lead to absurd results if they are consistently applied without consideration of qualitative criteria. We will then be in a position to classify Mormon theism in an informed and hopefully enlightening manner. II. The Inadequacy of Quantitative Definitions Confusion Among the Scholars The terms we have been discussing play an important role within religious studies, history of religions, biblical studies, and the philosophy of religion. But within each discipline there are scholars who find this terminology inadequate and use it only in combination with various modifiers. Some scholars go further and suggest that it be abandoned while others defend its propriety. A great deal of the confusion has been generated by etymological definitions emphasizing quantity. Rather than abandon the terminology, it would be more helpful for scholars to employ it with clear qualitative definitions. Since much of the discussion has centered on monotheism, I will illustrate the point by making some observations about the debate surrounding its usefulness for the study of early Judaism and Christianity.33 Scholars frequently identify monotheism as one of the key commitments that distinguished and unified Jewish identity in the Greco-Roman world.34 A handful of scholars, however, have argued that it is inaccurate to describe early Jewish beliefs as For a summary of the main positions, see James F. McGrath, The Only True God: Early Christian Monotheism in Its Jewish Context (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 1-22. Essays representing the main positions in the debate can be found in Stuckenbruck and North, eds., Early Jewish and Christian Monotheism. 34 E.g., E.P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice & Belief 63 BCE-66 CE (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992), 242-47; James D.G. Dunn, The Partings of the Ways Between Christianity and Judaism and their Significance for the Character of Christianity (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), 19-21; N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 248-59. 33 12 monotheistic.35 While Jews and Christians insisted on the exclusive worship of Israel's national deity, they did not consistently deny the existence of all other divine beings. In fact, it is easy to find Jewish and Christian texts in which words like theos and elohim refer to such beings in ways that presuppose their existence. If monotheism is the belief that precisely one theos exists, then the authors of these texts were not monotheists. Rather, as Paula Fredriksen says, "ancient monotheists were polytheists."36 Because of this, she suggests that monotheism should face mandatory retirement. Other scholars working with the same texts continue to find monotheism to be a necessary category. William Horbury, for example, retains its use but makes a distinction between "exclusive monotheism" and "inclusive monotheism."37 Exclusive monotheism denies the existence of all divine beings except Israel's God. Inclusive monotheism, on the other hand, affirms the existence of various kinds of supramundane beings but places the God of Israel above them all and reserves worship for him.38 Richard Bauckham, however, finds Horbury's qualifications unnecessary. Bauckham observes that "such beings have been considered creatures, created by and subject to God, no more a qualification of monotheism than the existence of earthly creatures is."39 Along similar lines, Larry Hurtado insists that "monotheism does not involve denying the existence of such beings, only that they properly cannot be compared with the one deity in status and significance, and even in nature."40 The scholars mentioned above who reject the use of monotheism are implicitly defining it etymologically. This is why they assess whether texts are monotheistic on the basis of whether words like elohim and theos are used to refer to beings other than Most notably, Peter Hayman, "Monotheism—a Misused Word in Jewish Studies?" JJS 42 (1991): 1-15 and Margaret Barker, The Great Angel: A Study of Israel's Second God (London: SPCK: 1992). 36 Paula Fredriksen, "Mandatory Retirement: Ideas in the Study of Christian Origins Whose Time Has Come to Go," in Israel's God and Rebecca's Children: Christology and Community in Early Judaism and Christianity, ed. David B. Capes, et. al. (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007), 37. 37 "Jewish and Christian Monotheism in the Herodian Age," in Stuckenbruck and North, eds., Early Jewish and Christian Monotheism, 16-44. 38 Though not created with this particular debate in mind, philosopher George Mavrodes has developed a more extensive and useful set of distinctions between different types of monotheism and polytheism. But as with many biblical scholars, he begins by assuming that monotheism and polytheism on their own must refer to quantitative concepts. See George I. Mavrodes, "Polytheism," in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, ed. Thomas D. Senor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), 261-86 and idem, "Monotheism," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, 10 vols. (London and New York: 1998), 6.479-83. 39 Jesus and the God of Israel, 108. 40 Larry Hurtado, "Monotheism," in The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism, ed. John J. Collins and Daniel C. Harlow (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming). 35 13 Israel's God. If this usage is found, then it is evidence of polytheism or henotheism.41 In contrast, scholars like Bauckham and Hurtado do not see monotheism as a thesis about how many beings exist that happen to be called "gods." In the very same texts that others deem problematic for Jewish monotheism, they find important conceptual distinctions drawn between the God of Israel and all other divine beings.42 This makes it clear to them that exclusive monotheism was the norm among early Jews and Christians. The analysis of Bauckham and Hurtado presupposes that monotheism should be understood qualitatively. It is also sensitive to the equivocal ways in which theos and cognate terms were used in antiquity. The disparate ways in which scholars understand monotheism render some of their disagreements more apparent than real. Sometimes what one scholar identifies as an example of monotheism another identifies as polytheism or henotheism with no significant difference between their phenomenological descriptions. This serves to muddy the waters and make it difficult to always discern where real disagreements are found. The confusion this generates is one of the reasons that Paula Fredriksen would like scholars of early Judaism and Christianity to abandon monotheism altogether. But in one passage Fredriksen unwittingly suggests a more fruitful corrective. She states: What do we mean by 'monotheism'? In the modern context of its origin, the word denotes belief in a single god who is the only god. When modern scholars transpose the term to antiquity, the definition remains constant. And that is a large part of the problem.43 Fredriksen is correct to identify the root problem as a particular definition of monotheism inadequate to describe ancient patterns of belief. If monotheism is determined simply by counting the number of beings someone identifies as gods, then it applies to no ancient belief system. But she seems unaware that the word can also be used with qualitative definitions amenable to the combination of emic as well as etic perspectives.44 This is clear when Fredriksen mistakenly identifies the quantitative definition as the original. The proper corrective is not to abandon monotheism as a useful category, but to abandon dubious quantitative definitions derived from the word's etymology. In evolutionary models of religious development, henotheism represents a transitional stage between polytheism and monotheism. Henotheism is commonly defined as the belief that many deities exist but worship is rendered to only one. 42 Especially see Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel, 107-26 and Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 29-52. 43 Fredriksen, "Mandatory Retirement," 35. 44 Emic perspectives are those that would be acceptable given the categories and perceptions of someone within the culture being studied. Etic perspectives employ concepts and categories external to the culture being studied that are useful to scholars conducting the investigation. 41 14 What kinds of gods count? What sort of belief? Up to this point my discussion has focused on the definition, history, and use of atheism, monotheism, and polytheism. I wish now to focus on atheism, monotheism, and polytheism more directly as concepts. My contentions are simple. Despite the etymology of the term, belief in the existence of one god is not a sufficient criterion for a religion to be classified as monotheistic. Likewise, belief in the existence of multiple gods is not sufficient for a religion to be classified as polytheistic. Perhaps most astonishing, atheism is not necessarily incompatible with the belief that one or more gods exist. If I am correct about these contentions, then important implications follow for how we classify Mormonism and a few other religions. Let's imagine that Mack and Sam each believe in the existence of one god but no others. Mack is convinced that the Great Blue Ball is the only god that exists. He has no doubt about its existence; he regularly watches it float near the ceiling of his apartment. Friends tell Mack that his god is really a helium balloon, but he pays them no mind. The Great Blue Ball is an object of sublime beauty and Mack derives satisfaction from worshipping it. Is Mack a monotheist? He is according to a strictly etymological definition of monotheism but it is pretty clear that Mack's theology does not really fit the concept of monotheism. The concept does not cover belief in the existence of any sort of entity that one might identify as a god. It presupposes belief in a particular sort of deity. In other words, the concept of monotheism entails a particular conception of God. Sam's god, on the other hand, is a rational and very powerful being who can accomplish astonishing feats. When Sam prays to his god sometimes things happen that convince him that his prayers were answered. Sam is also convinced that his god is responsible for many things that happen for which he did not pray. When Sam watches the evening news he can discern the handiwork of his god in some of the reported events. Sam insists that he believes in the one true god and that all other "gods" are psychological projections or mythological characters. On first blush it appears that Sam is a monotheist. However, there is an idiosyncrasy in Sam's "monotheism"—he believes that Hermes is the one true god. Just as in the Olympian myths, Hermes is a precocious trickster and thief.45 With his magical staff he causes people to sleep or wake at will, creating opportunities that he uses for good or malice. He is a magnificent communicator but not always trustworthy. He is usually benevolent to those who render worship, but he has a capricious vengeful streak as well. Because of this Sam is usually scrupulous to offer the sacrifices Hermes demands. But if Sam watches the news and detects Hermes' handiwork in a foreign My description of Hermes draws upon the sketch found in Burkert, Greek Religion, 156-59. 45 15 country, he saves himself the expense because it is unlikely that Hermes will find out. After all, even the one true god cannot be in two places at the same time. As with Mack, Sam is not a monotheist. The reason is simple: Hermes does not exemplify some of the key moral and metaphysical attributes one finds in the paradigm examples of monotheism. The monotheist does not merely believe in the existence of one deity of some sort or other. He believes in the existence of a particular sort of God, one who is the self-sufficient, necessarily good, unchangeable, trustworthy, all powerful, omnipresent, and all-knowing Creator upon whom all things depend for their existence. One might argue for the inclusion of additional attributes or question how we should understand those that are listed, but these are the basic parameters of the concept. Furthermore, the monotheist understands the nature of God to be such that there could not possibly be more than one deity of this sort. The monos is entailed by the nature of the theos. In like manner, the concept of polytheism also presupposes deities with particular moral and metaphysical attributes derived from paradigm examples. Mack could believe in the existence of several Great Blue Balls but that would not make him a polytheist. Sam, however, might be plausibly classified as a polytheist despite believing that only one god exists. That would certainly be the correct classification if in Sam's theology Hermes happens to be the one true god because, say, he deprived the rest of the Olympians of their immortality by means of some chance discovery. Now let's take the thought experiment one step further. The Smithsonian arranges to exhibit the world's ten most valuable gemstones in a single case. To protect the exhibit, a new security system is installed that incorporates several very advanced technological features never before seen. One day the security system is tripped and there, caught in the act of stealing the gems, is Hermes himself. Though very powerful and clever, Hermes is unable to free himself. Everyone is compelled to believe in the existence of Hermes, but does this disprove monotheism and atheism in favor of polytheism? Not necessarily. It could turn out that something like Erich von Däniken's ancient astronaut theory or the plotline of the television show Stargate SG1 is true. In that case everyone would "believe in" the god Hermes, but not in the relevant sense. Monotheists and atheists would continue to reject the Olympian worldview and classify Hermes as a member of an advanced species from elsewhere in the universe and not a deity worthy of worship. Both atheism and monotheism are compatible with the existence of any number of such gods. Here is the upshot of this thought experiment. The concepts designated by the terms we have been discussing are not really concerned with linguistic trivialities about how many entities happen to be called "god." They are instead concerned with a set of claims about the existence of particular sorts of deities and, by implication, the nature of the cosmos. Monotheism and polytheism each presuppose that the deities they affirm possess particular moral and metaphysical attributes drawn from paradigmatic 16 examples. Furthermore, when speaking of how many gods are 'believed in,' mere 'belief in the existence of' is not the whole picture. The more pertinent sense of belief is 'devotion and cultic reverence for, worship.' Thus, before classifying a religion or system of belief as monotheistic or polytheistic, we should consider not just the number of gods it postulates, but also the nature of those gods, their relationship to the cosmos, and whether those gods are objects of worship. When doing so a few religions may turn out to be neither polytheistic nor monotheistic, but something else. In such cases we should resist the temptation to pigeon-hole. III. Mormon Theism Mormonism in its traditional form makes a number of metaphysical and theological claims that set it apart from the paradigm examples of atheism, monotheism or polytheism. Paradoxically, Mormonism also exemplifies characteristics found at the core of each concept. These can be summarized under the following headings. (1) Eternalism. The universe and its basic constituents have always existed in some form. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo is rejected along with the understanding of the universe's contingency entailed by that doctrine. (2) Metaphysical Pluralism. There are several ultimate entities or principles. These include the uncreated, chaotic matter from which this world was fashioned (D&C 93:33; Book of Abraham 3:24; 4:1), eternally existing intelligences at various stages of progression,46 and eternal laws or principles that regulate the universe. Each of these things self-exists and their most basic properties and potentialities are brute facts. (3) Theological Finitism is entailed by eternalism and pluralism. God is a highly developed intelligence who exists within an environment that he neither made nor transcends in the manner affirmed by classical theism. Though very powerful within the cosmos, what he is capable of fashioning and doing is limited by the uncreated natures of matter, intelligences and principles. (4) Eternalism and Finitism entail an odd form of Naturalism. That is, there is no "supernatural" realm or being transcending the uncreated natural realm of matter, energy, intelligence and eternal law. Mormonism's is an odd form of naturalism because it does not entail denial of the existence of deities, angels The nature of intelligences has been debated within Mormonism, but this is the view that became dominant within the tradition. See Blake T. Ostler, "The Idea of Pre-Existence in the Development of Mormon Thought," Dialogue 15/1 (1982): 59-78 and "The Idea of Preexistence in Mormon Thought," in Line Upon Line: Essays on Mormon Doctrine, ed. Gary James Bergera (Salt Lake City: Signature, 1989), 127-44. 46 17 and demons, nor does it preclude the occurrence of unusual events that defy what seems to be possible given our current scientific understanding of world and its laws (i.e. miracles). Rather, traditional Mormonism affirms the existence of each of these but defines them in ways that differ significantly from the classical tradition. (5) Plurality of Gods. Authoritative Mormon texts such as the Book of Abraham and Joseph Smith's later sermons explicitly teach that many Gods exist. These Gods rule over other worlds and are not objections of worship for the inhabitants of this world. (6) Divine-human nature. All intelligences, spirits, human beings, angels, demons, and Gods share the same metaphysical nature. They are members of the same species at differing stages of development. (7) Eternal Progression & Exaltation. The God with whom we have to do has not always been God. He was once an intelligence and later lived as a man on another world. He was exalted to Godhood by following eternal principles, developing in his moral character, and obeying the God above him.47 We too can be exalted by following his example. "God," then, is an honorific title.48 (8) Embodiment, Gender & Sexuality. God the Father possesses a gendered, glorified physical body.49 His counterpart and wife is Heavenly Mother.50 Official statements of the First Presidency suggest that God the Father and Heavenly Mother procreate spirit children through sexual union. Though not commonly mentioned today, earlier LDS writings frequently defend the idea that Jesus was begotten on earth by God and Mary in the same manner.51 (9) Moral Goodness & Mutability. Gods are exemplars of moral goodness and virtue who work together in harmony. However, it is metaphysically Recently some Mormon thinkers have questioned whether this view is compatible with the LDS Standard Works or entailed by statements made in Joseph Smith's King Follett Discourse. Especially see Blake T. Ostler, Of God and the Gods vol. 3 of Exploring Mormon Thought (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2008), 17-26. 48 Paulsen, "Comparative Coherency," 71. 49 This kind of embodiment is not analogous to the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Within Mormon theism embodiment is a natural stage in the development of intelligences as they progress towards Godhood. It is an expression of the single metaphysical nature that all sentient beings share. Within Christian theology the second Person of the Trinity takes on a human nature in addition to his intrinsic divine nature. Embodiment is natural to his humanity but not to his divinity. 50 David Paulsen discusses this distinctive notion in "Are Christians Mormon? Reassessing Joseph Smith's Theology in His Bicentennial," BYU Studies 45/1 (2006): 96-102 51 Douglas J. Davies very diplomatically describes the belief thusly: Jesus is taken to be the Son of God "in the most direct sense of God the Father engaging with Mary to engender his Son" (An Introduction to Mormonism [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 69). 47 18 possible for a God to cease being all-good and thus fall from his status as a God.52 Mormonism and Monotheism Authoritative LDS texts affirm that there is one God (1 Nephi 13:41; Alma 11:2629; Ether 2:8; D&C 20:19). This God is the Supreme Creator (Alma 30:44; cf. Alma 11:22; D&C 107:4). He is omnipotent (Mosiah 3:5, 17-18, 21; 5:2, 15; D&C 61:1), all-knowing (2 Nephi 27:10; Alma 40:8; Ether 3:25-26), eternal and unchangeable (Mormon 9:19; Moroni 8:18; D&C 20:17, cf. v. 28), infinitely good and merciful (2 Nephi 1:10; Mosiah 5:3; Helaman 12:1; Moroni 8:3; Mosiah 28:4). Though no longer included in the Standard Works, the Lectures on Faith contain a similar theology. God is described as "the only supreme governor and independent being in whom all fulness and perfection dwell. He is omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, without beginning of days or end of life."53 These texts appear to straightforwardly establish Mormon theism as a variety of classic monotheism. But, studying Mormon theology would not be very interesting if it was simple to establish Mormon doctrine! All of these passages were written early in Joseph Smith's prophetic career. Smith's later teachings introduced a number of notions that would bear upon the LDS understanding of the divine attributes affirmed in these texts. These notions include the idea that God works within an environment comprised of uncreated matter, intelligences, and laws or principles. God did not create our world out of nothing but from preexisting chaotic matter. God's nature is progressive (he was not always God), other Gods exist in addition to the God of our world, and human beings possess the same nature and potential as God. Smith was murdered before he had a chance to reconcile his earlier and later teachings about God. The task was left to Brigham Young and second-generation Mormon intellectuals like B.H. Roberts and John Widtsoe.54 In their works Smith's later teachings serve as the hermeneutical lens through which to interpret statements about God's attributes found in the Book of Mormon and early sections of the Doctrine & Covenants. The result is a unique cosmology that leads Mormon intellectuals to redefine omnipotence, omniscience, unchageability, etc. within the context of Mormon theology.55 It also leads Mormons to speak of God in ways that See further Carl Mosser, "Exaltation and Gods Who Can Fall: Some Problems for Mormon Theodicies," Element 3/1-2 (2007): 45-67. 53 Lecture 2:2 in Larry E. Dahl and Charles D. Tate, eds., The Lectures on Faith in Historical Perspective (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 1990), 39. 54 Eugene England narrates key moments of the process in "Progression and Perfection: Two Complimentary Ways to Talk about God," BYU Studies 29/3 (1989): 31-47. 55 Examples include: John A. Wistsoe, Rational Theology (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1997), 9-15, 2324, 61-65; B.H. Roberts, The Truth, The Way, The Life, An Elementary Treatise on Theology: The Masterwork of B.H. Roberts, ed. Stan Larson (San Francisco: Smith Research Associates, 1994), 472-83, cf. 373-83; Sterling McMurrin, The Philosophical Foundations of Mormon Theology (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 52 19 are distinctive enough that one LDS philosopher has devoted an entire chapter to "The Meaning of 'God' in Mormon Thought."56 Mormon cosmology requires an understanding of God that is finitistic and progressive. It affirms a plurality of Gods who rule over other worlds. Men who achieve exaltation will become Gods who create and govern additional worlds. In each of these ways Mormon teachings represent a parting of the ways from the paradigm examples of monotheism.57 Traditional Mormon theism is not monotheistic in either the qualitative or quantitative sense. Beginning with Orson Pratt, there have always been some Mormons who dispute whether the predominant theological synthesis (or elements of it) accurately represents the teachings of Joseph Smith. This has been echoed by at least one non-Mormon scholar.58 Recent years have seen an increasing number of LDS intellectuals suggest that Smith's later teachings should be interpreted through the lens of the earlier writings included in the Standard Works. Whether this will lead to a viable form of Mormon monotheism remains to be seen. Mormonism and Polytheism The LDS Standard Works mention the existence of Gods other than the God that should be worshipped by this earth's inhabitants (Book of Abraham 4-5; D&C 121:32; D&C 132:18-20, 37). Joseph Smith also spoke openly about a plurality of Gods in his King Follet Discourse and Sermon in the Grove. Ever since, critics have charged Mormonism with polytheism. A common statement of the charge says that 1959); idem, The Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1965); Truman Madsen, Eternal Man (Salt Lake City: Deseret Publishing, 1966); Paulsen, "Comparative Coherency," 64-81; Kent E. Robson, "Time & Omniscience in Mormon Theology," Sunstone 5/3 (1980): 1723; Blake T. Ostler, "The Mormon Concept of God," Dialogue 17/2 (Summer 1984): 57-84; idem, The Attributes of God vol. 1 of Exploring Mormon Thought (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2001); Robert L. Millet, "The Supreme Power over All Things: The Doctrine of the Godhead in the Lectures on Faith," in The Lectures on Faith in Historical Perspective, ed. Larry E. Dahl and Charles D. Tate (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 1990), 223 n. 1. A dissenting view is registered by Stephen D. Robinson in Matthew R. Connelly, Stephen E. Robinson and Craig L. Blomberg, "Sizing Up the Divide: Reviews and Replies," BYU Studies 38/3 (1999): 175-76. 56 Ostler, The Attributes of God, 1-25. 57 For two reasons I have deliberately not discussed the nature of unity within the Godhead in this section. First, the focus is on the question of monotheism as such, not Christian monotheism in particular. Second, too often Latter-day Saints respond to the claim that Mormonism is not monotheistic by arguing that the LDS understanding of the Godhead qualifies as social trinitarianism. While unity in the Godhead is relevant to the question, it is secondary. Even if social trinitarianism is an appropriate way to describe Mormon teachings (I don't believe it is), establishing that leaves more important issues unaddressed. 58 See Paul Owen, "Monotheism, Mormonism and the New Testament Witness," in The New Mormon Challenge, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002), 468 n. 2 20 Mormonism is more polytheistic than Hinduism. Whereas Hinduism postulates 300 million gods, Mormonism postulates an infinite number of deities. More charitable students of Mormonism have also described Mormon beliefs as polytheistic. Rarely one even comes across a Latter-day Saint who describes Mormon theology as polytheistic. Whether presented as an accusation or merely a description, the idea that Mormonism is polytheistic depends entirely on the etymological definition of polytheism and its sole concern with quantity. We should keep in mind that polytheism was coined to refer to a type of religious beliefs and practices found in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, Rome and Scandinavia. No belief system should be classified as polytheistic unless it bears significant similarity to these paradigmatic examples. Of course, polytheistic religions display a great deal of variety. This makes it impossible to identify a single common denominator other than the fact that several gods are objects of cultic reverence. But, "some basic and characteristic features are discernable, even though not all of them may be present in each and every case."59 Polytheistic religions generally consider their deities to be gendered and metaphysically finite.60 Each has authority over specific areas of nature or society such as fertility, war, love, healing and the underworld. Gods can also have authority over specific trades. Each deity is accorded distinct cultic devotion appropriate to his or her position in the pantheon and importance to a society's needs. Polytheistic gods are not always exemplars of moral virtue and can have rivalries with one another. Often the gods that are worshipped are a second or third generation who have assumed their positions upon defeating a preceding generation in primordial combat. The ordering of the world and humanity's creation is sometimes explained as the result of such combat. These characteristics are common but some are not found in certain polytheistic religions. One idea that does seem to be universal is that the basic elements of the world have always existed in some form. As a result, no god is omnipotent in the traditional sense. Many religions also count forces like fate and magic among the primal elements and see even the gods subject to them. Both ancient and contemporary polytheistic religions display a tendency to develop forms that posit some kind of unity between the gods. Sometimes the gods of the pantheon are considered parts of an organic whole analogous to the human body composed of individual parts with distinct functions. More often the gods who are worshipped are considered manifestations of a hidden high god, an impersonal divine reality or a philosophical principle. Because of this some scholars reclassify these religions as monotheistic. However, there remain significant differences between an Werblowsky, "Polytheism," 11.435-39. This and the following paragraph are adapted from Carl Mosser, "Polytheism," in New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics, ed. W.C. Campbell-Jack and Gavin McGrath (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2006), 558. 59 60 21 omnipotent creator and a very powerful god who may be behind the gods. Even when high gods are praised as creators of the world they are in reality mere craftsman; invariably they fashion the world from uncreated materials. Moreover, the unity attributed to the gods does not lead to unity of devotional practice. The various gods continue to be objects of distinct cultic reverence.61 If we focus narrowly on metaphysical issues, it would be hard to deny that there are some striking similarities between polytheistic and traditional Mormon cosmologies.62 This might justify classifying Mormonism as quasi-polytheistic. But there are also some very significant differences. These include: 1. Polytheistic worship is distributed between many gods. Latter-day Saint worship if reserved only for the Godhead who rules over this world.63 2. Many polytheistic gods are personifications of nature or associated with specific aspects of nature or society. Mormonism's Gods have power over all aspects of nature and society within the worlds that they rule. 3. Whereas polytheism is idolatrous in the strict sense of the term, Latter-day Saints do not even use images in their liturgy and prayers. 4. Mormonism's Gods are exemplars of moral virtue; polytheistic gods often look more like exemplars of vice. 5. Polytheistic gods often compete with one another and sometimes engage in combat. Mormonism's Gods are united in their purposes. Any God who breaks this unity falls from his status as a God.64 6. In polytheistic religions the sexuality of the gods is regularly displayed in promiscuity, fornication and adultery. Sexual activity of the LDS God is expressed within the moral boundaries of marriage and family life.65 There are very significant differences between paradigmatic forms of polytheism and Mormonism. It is inappropriate to classify Mormonism as a polytheistic religion. To do so conveys highly misleading connotations. Additional features of polytheistic beliefs about the gods are summarized nicely in Theodore M. Ludwig, "Gods and Goddesses," in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade, 16 vols (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 6.59-66. 62 See Jim W. Adams, "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph Smith? God, Creation, and Humanity in the Old Testament and Mormonism," in The New Mormon Challenge, 179-90. 63 To keep the focus on polytheism as traditionally understood rather than tritheism, questions about the nature of unity within the Godhead will be passed over. 64 See further Mosser, "Exaltation and Gods Who Can Fall." 65 It is not entirely clear whether this is limited to marriage with a single Mother in Heaven or to multiple wives. The latter view was predominant in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 61 22 Mormonism and Atheism In recent literature the word atheism has been variously defined as disbelief in the existence of any deities, lack of belief in any deities, and denial of the existence of God. As with monotheism and polytheism, there has been a tendency to define the word strictly on the basis of its etymology. But we should remember that this modern word began its career in the sixteenth century as a way of saying "godlessness" or "impiety." In both senses of the phrase, that is the word's etymological meaning. But as noted earlier, this meaning was quickly eclipsed and it became widely used as a designation for belief systems that deny the existence of God. Particularly in view is the God of classic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This remains the most widespread sense in which atheism is used. The modern concept of atheism is comprised of disbelief regarding the existence of the classical God complemented by the affirmation of naturalism. It is usually assumed that this entails disbelief in any sort of deity, but that is not quite right. As we have already seen, while most atheists would gladly endorse that disbelief, atheism is compatible with the existence of any deity that can fit within a naturalistic understanding of the cosmos. The God of traditional Mormon theism appears to be that sort of deity. He is not an absolute creator, he does not transcend the cosmos, and his power is limited by eternal principles, natural laws, the innate properties of matter, and other uncreated entities. In this light, it comes as no surprise that many LDS philosophers find several arguments designed to establish atheism congenial to their apologetic efforts. These Latter-day Saints simply agree with the majority of atheists on several key issues in metaphysics. The apologetic strategy is three-pronged. The first prong is to appropriate the strongest available atheistic arguments to prove that the God of classical theism does not exist. The second is to show that the Mormon concept of God is immune to these arguments. Finally, arguments for God's existence that underdetermine classical theism are deployed. The goal is to establish the philosophical superiority of Mormon theism vis-à-vis both classical theism and atheism. A few scholars have gone so far as to classify Mormonism as a sophisticated form of atheism, most notably A.A. Howsepian in a 1996 article.66 One LDS scholar, Daniel Peterson, charged that Howsepian's "breathtakingly audacious" claim depends on "lexical imperialism" and "terminological trickiness" in place of rigorous analysis.67 The ground for these charges is the fact that Howsepian defined God in broadly Anselmian terms. Peterson found this to be an "idiosyncratically restrictive definition" that renders 66 67 A.A. Howsepian, "Are Mormons Theists?" Religious Studies 32 (1996): 357-70. Daniel C. Peterson, "Editor's Introduction," FARMS Review of Books 10/2 (1998): v-xx. 23 Howsepian's arguments irrelevant.68 But most troubling was the way in which Howsepian repeatedly used atheism and atheist.69 Howsepian's use of these terms, Peterson observes, are not merely idiosyncratic; they entail that every polytheistic religion to ever exist should also be classified as a sophisticated form of atheism.70 Peterson seems to think that this reduces Howsepian's argument to absurdity. The fact, however, is that Howsepian's usage is far from idiosyncratic; he has nearly 350 years of precedent in its favor. My earlier discussion about More's taxonomy of religions shows that Howsepian's use of atheism and atheist was current no later than 1660. It also provides an example of someone explicitly drawing the conclusion about polytheism implicit in Howsepian's use of these terms. More's precedent is significant because of his role shaping the modern understanding of monotheism and atheism. But precedent is not limited to seventeenth-century examples or contemporary Christian writers who might be motivated to exclude Mormonism from Christianity. Contemporary atheists use this terminology in much the same sense when they take theism and atheism to be the two primary taxa under which to classify religious views. This becomes clear when we observe that contemporary philosophers define theism in precisely the sense that More ascribed to monotheism. Take J.L. Mackie's highly regarded Miracle of Theism, for example. Mackie begins by identifying theism as the doctrine that there is a god "as conceived in the central tradition of the main monotheistic religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam."71 Following Richard Swinburne, Mackie takes the primary doctrines of theism to be that there is a god who is "a person without a body (i.e. a spirit), present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the universe, a free agent, able to do everything (i.e. omnipotent), knowing all things, perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, immutable, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship."72 Atheism is the denial that such a person exists. Subsequent atheist philosophers like Nicholas Everitt and Graham Oppy take a similar approach. Everitt identifies theism with the monotheistic understanding of God shared by mainstream Christianity, Judaism and Islam. He explicitly indicates that the term theism does not apply to religions that are not monotheistic.73 Graham Oppy similarly understands the debate between theism and atheism to be about the existence of a god "Editor's Introduction," xiii. "Editor's Introduction," viii. 70 "Editor's Introduction," ix, xi. 71 J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 1. 72 The definition is taken from Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 2. It is found in the same place in the 1993 revised edition. 73 Nicholas Everitt, The Non-Existence of God (London: Routledge, 2004), 14. 68 69 24 like the one described in orthodox monotheism. The fact that there are arguments for the existence of non-monotheistic gods is mentioned only to be dismissed as irrelevant to the debate.74 According to Oppy, "a theist assigns a probability to the claim that an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists that is vague over an interval that is bounded below by 50 percent; an atheist assigns a probability to the claim that an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists that is vague over an interval that is bounded above by 50 percent."75 Everitt makes the same point more succinctly: an atheist is "someone who thinks it at least more likely than not that God does not exist."76 Lest there be any doubt about the relevant understanding of God, Everitt offers a definition. God "is the creator and preserver of everything, a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfect. He is in some sense a conscious or minded being, in that he is the subject of various psychological predicates…. He is eternal, and omnipresent; and he is without bodily parts. Finally, he is an appropriate object of worship."77 Everitt anticipates objections like Peterson's. "Why should anyone accept this definition, and what should be said to objectors who say 'That's just your definition of God. Who is to say that yours is the right one? I have my own different definition'." Everitt's response is that his definition "can claim historical and linguistic accuracy. A huge tradition of people over the last two millennia who have declared a belief in God have understood 'God' in substantially the sense defined." (Observe that Everitt's definition does not require a specifically Anselmian understanding of God.) While agreement has not been universal, there is a broad consensus about the properties that God has even if those properties have sometimes been understood in different ways. Of course, a person can define God differently if he chooses. After all, says Everitt, "Anyone is free to be a linguistic deviant."78 Though Oppy and Everitt are aware that some religions do not meet the criteria they list for theism, it is doubtful that they intend to include any of them under the umbrella of atheism. But if atheism is simply the belief that it is unlikely that an orthdoxly conceived monotheistic God exists, then it follows that all forms of pantheism, polytheism, etc. are forms of atheism. The only significant difference between More's seventeenth-century taxonomy and this one is that More explicitly states the implications for these religious types. Taken at face value, the definitions of God, theism, and atheism put forward by Mackie, Everitt, and Oppy also entail that Mormonism qualifies as a form of atheism. It is unlikely that many atheists are familiar enough with Mormon theology to know this, though. So no one can accuse these philosophers of redefining the terms in order to Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2. Arguing about Gods, 37. 76 Non-Existence of God, 14. 77 Non-Existence of God, 15. 78 Non-Existence of God, 16. 74 75 25 exclude Mormonism from any desirable group or category. To the contrary, they have inadvertently included Mormonism in the group that they consider most desirable. Of course, there is something odd about calling someone an atheist who affirms the existence of some sort of deity. It seems that there is an appropriate sense in which one can refer to such people as theists even if they are not theists in the sense pertinent to the atheism/theism debate. William Rowe maintains that some religious beliefs can be classified as atheistic in the sense above but still be considered theistic in another sense without contradiction. In an influential essay on the problem of evil Rowe helpfully distinguishes between a narrow and broad sense of theist and atheist. It is worth quoting him at length on this point. By a "theist" in the narrow sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, supremely good being who created the world. By a "theist" in the broad sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of some sort of divine being or divine reality. To be a theist in the narrow sense is also to be a theist in the broad sense, but one may be a theist in the broad sense—as was Paul Tillich—without believing that there is a supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal being who created the world. Similar distinctions must be made between a narrow and a broad sense of the terms "atheist" and "agnostic." To be an atheist in the broad sense is to deny the existence of any sort of divine being or divine reality. Tillich was not an atheist in the broad sense. But he was an atheist in the narrow sense, for he denied that there exists a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly good.79 When we apply Rowe's distinctions to traditional Mormonism, Mormonism turns out to be a form of atheism in the narrow sense but a form of theism in the broad sense. Mormonism and Anglo-American Finite Theism If traditional Mormonism is theistic in the broad sense but it is not a form of monotheism or polytheism, what kind of theism is it? Here David Paulsen points the way. In his doctoral dissertation David classified Mormon theism as a form of theistic finitism alongside the theologies of John Stuart Mill, William James, and Edgar Sheffield Brightman.80 Elsewhere he and other LDS philosophers have described significant "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," APQ 16/4 (1979): 335-41, reprinted in William Lane Craig, ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 317-27 (here at 317-18). 80 "Comparative Coherency," 3-90. 79 26 similarities between Mormon and process theism, another position commonly classified as finite theism. A few years ago Frank Dilley published an article that pleads for philosophers to reconsider finite theism. He describes three finite theologies that he thinks deserve serious consideration: David Ray Griffin's version of process theism, Brightman's personal idealism, and the Platonic version presented in the Timaeus. Dilley identifies three core features common to these views: "creation is not ex nihilo; that the world is coeternal with God; and that God only has limited power to deal with the problem of evil since there are aspects to the created order that God did not deliberately create and which operate independently of the divine will."81 In addition, Dilley contends that for any finite theism to be religiously adequate, God cannot be limited in goodness. 82 In this regard finite theism retains genuine similarity with monotheistic conceptions of God. According to Dilley's criteria, Mormonism is quite clearly a form of finite theism. In his recent work David avoids using the term finite to describe the LDS understanding of God. He does not think it is inappropriate if properly understood. He is concerned that it is too easily misunderstood and can be rhetorically inappropriate.83 Indeed, the term finite theism can be easily misunderstood. But the problem can be mitigated if we give the designation greater specificity. So, that is what I propose we should do. It is pretty clear that except for the Platonic version, finite theisms arose in England and America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All are motivated by a desire to avoid the perceived shortcomings of Judeo-Christian monotheism. They share important beliefs about the nature of God, creation, and the cosmos. If we want a category of theism in the broad sense that will allow traditional Mormonism to be placed alongside theologies with which it bears deep family resemblances, at least in terms of its cosmology and metaphysical assumptions, we can do no better than AngloAmerican finite theism. Within Anglo-American finite theism we can distinguish species of singular finitism and plural finitism. However, we should not pigeon-hole any of them into the categories of monotheism or polytheism.84 Instead, we should let finite theism stand as a category of its own. Frank B. Dilley, "A finite God reconsidered," IJPR 47 (2000): 29-30. "A finite God reconsidered," 34. 83 David L. Paulsen and R. Dennis Potter, "How Deep the Chasm? A Reply to Owen and Mosser's Review," FARMS Review of Books 11/2 (1999): 236. 84 In any case, the previous discussion establishes that "finitistic monotheism" would be an oxymoron and "finitistic polytheism" a pleonasm. 81 82 27